Indeterminacy and the Establishment Clause by Gedicks, Frederick Mark
INDETERMINACY AND THE 
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 
Frederick Mark Gedicks* 
Since Professor Greenawalt criticizes my own approach to 
the religion clauses (pp. 434-39),1 I will focus my comments 
there. Professor Greenawalt fairly summarizes my position as 
follows: 
Professor Gedicks's main thesis is that the Supreme Court's 
dominant "discourse" has been "secular" and "individualist," 
but that many of its decisions can be adequately explained 
only by an older "religious communitarian" discourse that al-
lows governments to exercise their power to encourage peo-
ple to accept the foundational morality of conservative relig-
ion. Gedicks concludes that were the Supreme Court to make 
the doctrinal changes that would render the law of the relig-
ion clauses "a coherent expression of secular individualism," 
that would be highly unpopular. And, at this stage in the 
country's history, "[r]eligious communitarian discourse is not 
a viable alternative to secular individualism." The Court can-
not develop a compromise position because the two dis-
courses are "mutually exclusive." (p. 435) (alteration in origi-
nal) (footnotes omitted).2 
Conceding that this is an accurate summation of the concep-
tual incoherence of establishment clause jurisprudence, 
Greenawalt nevertheless argues that some viable discourse 
might yet emerge if courts were more transparent about how 
they weigh conflicting establishment clause values (p. 436). This 
seems unlikely. There's little evidence that the pockets of coher-
ence that periodically appear in establishment clause doctrine 
are anything more than way stations on a road to nowhere. 
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Take, for example, "neutrality" analysis of financial aid to 
religion under the establishment clause. So long as financial aid 
to religion is disbursed directly to individuals who have qualified 
on the basis of religiously neutral criteria, such aid does not vio-
late the establishment clause.' Indeed, it was widely thought that 
denying such aid under these circumstances amounted to im-
permissible discrimination against religion. 
Enter Locke v. Davey," which reviewed the constitutionality 
of a state-funded scholarship program that uses religiously neu-
tral criteria to fund the college education of individual college 
students, unless they're studying for the ministry. It's hard to see 
this refusal as anything but a religious classification deployed 
precisely to deny a state financial benefit to students whose 
study. we may safely assume, is a "religious" activity. Neverthe-
less, the Court found that this denial was permitted by the "play 
in the joints" of the superstructure that connects the establish-
ment clause with the free exercise clause.' Ironically, this same 
looseness permits the Court to lean in the opposite direction, 
when it is so inclined, as when it rejected an establishment clause 
challenge to prayers offered by denominational ministers at the 
opening of a state legislative session." Like the joints of an old 
rocking chair. these connections are so loose that they leave 
room for state action that purposefully advantages or disadvan-
tages particular religious activities without somehow violating 
the antidiscrimination principles of either religion clause. 
At present. the religious antidiscrimination principle under 
the establishment clause is that a state cannot advantage or dis-
advantage religious practice by the use of religious classifica-
tions ... except when it can. To sum up the financial aid cases, 
states may not depart from religious neutrality by employing re-
ligious classifications that deny state benefits to believers, except 
when the benefit is not too big and disallowing it would be his-
torically incongruous or politically controversial, even though 
the state may grant a similar benefit, if disallowing this other 
benefit would likewise be historically incongruous and politically 
controversiaL because a core historical purpose of the establish-
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ment clause is to prevent state support of ministers, except 
sometimes. 7 God bless America. 
* * * 
Which brings us to the other major doctrinal vein of the es-
tablishment clause, cases involving government adoption of reli-
gious symbols or practices. The rule here initially required that 
the states be neutral or even-handed between "religion" and 
"non-religion,"x which logically meant that the states could not 
use any symbols or practices, or must use all symbols and prac-
tices. The former is impossible, while the latter is, well, really 
impossible. Or maybe it's the other way around. 
The Court slipped this trap by assuming that sometimes re-
ligious symbols used by the states mean nothing. Happily, the 
states are not required to be neutral among religiously meaning-
less symbols. Less happily, the same symbol can be both mean-
ingful and meaningless. How to tell the difference? (Paging Jus-
tice O'Connor.) 
The Court has answered this question in a line of cases that 
starts with Christmas Nativity scenes, and rests for the moment 
with monuments of-or is it to?-the Ten Commandments, 
while waiting for the arrival of the Pledge of Allegiance. The 
rule that has emerged requires a suspension of common sense, 
rather like rational basis review: If one can construct some imag-
inable basis for arguing that a religious symbol is not really reli-
gious, then its deployment by the state doesn't violate the estab-
lishment clause, even when it's obvious that the symbol in fact 
retains substantial religious content. Thus has a Nativity scene 
commemorating the virgin birth of the Christian savior been re-
duced to the commercialism of the candy canes that surrounded 
it,9 a minor Jewish holiday inflated to the theological significance 
of the most important Christian holiday,10 the Ten Command-
ments incorporated into the "our nation's heritage," 11 and, in a 
preview of the Pledge, "under God" transformed into an histori-
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cal marker of more pious days gone by. 1' As statements of cul-
tural fact these holdings are all, shall we say, slightly off the 
mark.L' 
To sum up, the Court has clearly stated that the states may 
not adopt religious symbols or practices, except in contexts 
where one might plausibly imagine that the symbols have lost 
their religious content, even when it's apparent that the symbols 
remain religiously potent, which would seem to make the pur-
portedly plausible loss of symbolic religious content implausible, 
but never mind. 
* * * 
Professor Greenawalt eventually retreats to the familiar last 
refuge of doctrinal coherentists, "hard cases make bad law," 
suggesting that cases requiring difficult line-drawing at the mar-
gin of a rule should not be taken to undermine the essential sta-
bility of the paradigm situations governed by the rule's core 
meaning (pp. 437-38). The peculiarities of the Court's financial 
aid and religious symbol and practice cases, however, do not 
stem from unusual fact situations whose problematic resolution 
at the margins has left undisturbed some stable central meaning. 
In both lines of cases, the inconsistencies go directly to those 
supposedly stable cores. In Locke, for example, there is no seri-
ous question that the ministerial scholarship applicant was oth-
erwise fully qualified to receive the scholarship, that a religious 
classification was used to deny him the scholarship, and that the 
applicant thus suffered targeted religious discrimination by the 
state. These considerations go directly to what was thought to be 
the core meaning of both religion clauses-that states may not 
purposefully disadvantage citizens on the basis of their religious 
beliefs or practices. In the religious symbol and practice cases. 
one can imagine situations in which a once-religious symbol truly 
retains no appreciable religious significance-a Christmas tree 
might be an apt example. But there remains no serious question 
that Christian Nativity scenes and monuments to quotations 
from the most theologically conservative Protestant Bible are 
authentically religious symbols, regardless of who or what may 
be loitering in the vicinity. The only way for the Court to avoid 
12. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow. 542 U.S. 1. 26 (2004) (Rhenquist. C.J .. 
concurring in the judgment). 
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the core establishment clause rule that government may not en-
dorse or prefer one religion above another is to adopt the fiction 
that these religious symbols are not religious. 
Sense can be made of both lines of cases. however, by look-
ing at them as the interplay of a '"religious communitarian" dis-
course that understands the United States as a (theologically 
conservative) Christian nation that merely tolerates religious dif-
ference, and a secular individualist discourse that understands 
religious belief as just another taste or preference about which 
the state should express no opinion. 14 Religious communitarian-
ism became the dominant discourse in the United States in the 
early 19th century, and it has remained culturally potent even as 
its conceptual foundations have been eroded by decades of secu-
lar individualist religion clause holdings. Religious communitari-
anism accounts for both the Court's move to neutrality in the fi-
nancial aid cases, and its refusal to invalidate state appropriation 
of obvious religious symbols despite the supposed constitutional 
rule that bans state endorsements of religion. Secular individual-
ism was present at the founding and also retains its potency. 
which accounts for the Court's visceral invalidation of what 
should have been a paradigm application of religious neutrality 
in Locke, and its invalidations of state-adopted religious symbols 
when a rational basis for religious meaninglessness cannot be 
imagined. 
Professor Greenawalt accurately notes my skepticism about 
the determinacy of language in general, and legal reasoning in 
particular, labeling this a dramatic overstatement (p. 437). 1' 
Whether that's an overstatement is an argument for another day. 
What is clear today is the apparent stability at the surface of es-
tablishment clause doctrine belies the indeterminacy that's lurk-
ing just beneath, waiting for the case that upsets everything. 
Locke and Van Orden functioned in precisely this manner, un-
expectedly decentering apparently stable doctrinal resolutions. 
On this score, the safer bet is that incoherence in establishment 
clause doctrine is the rule rather than its exception. 
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